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Karl Barth on Creation 
 
 
It is no secret that Karl Barth’s theological star has waned in recent 
decades. But even currently invisible stars may, in principle, still have 
much light to shed on ancient, intractable problems. Science can no doubt 
be a useful dialogue partner for some areas of theology, but when it comes 
to the crunch of theodicy, Barth’s intuitions about the meaning of 
‘creation’ may perhaps still be more realistic than any amount of 
speculation about the ‘big bang’. 
 
 
Karl Barth’s thought is closely associated with the complete rejection of natural 
theology, and hence with any purely rational approach to the doctrine of creation. 
Rather than lamenting the shortcomings – from a Catholic point of view – of such an 
uncompromising approach to matters theological, it might be more helpful, initially 
at least, to consider Barth’s positive understanding of creation. A useful summary of 
the latter can be found in chapters eight and nine of his Dogmatics in Outline,1 the 
text of a series of lectures delivered in Bonn in the summer of 1946. 
 
 Barth rejects the idea that the doctrine of creation could be somehow easier to 
understand or more accessible to us than any other aspect of the creed. In his view it 
is false to imagine that we do not need to rely as much on revelation in dealing with 
creation as we do in dealing with other articles of faith. It is not, in other words, as if 
Christians needed revelation to discover, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity, but 
could work out by human reasoning alone that the world is God’s creation. ‘[I]t is 
not’, he writes, ‘the existence of the world in its manifoldness, from which we are to 
read off the fact that God is its Creator. The world with its sorrow and its happiness 
will always be a dark mirror to us, about which we may have optimistic or 
pessimistic thoughts; but it gives us no information about God as the Creator. But 
                                                 
1 K. Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, tr. G. T. Thomson (London: SCM, 1949). 
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always, when man has tried to read the truth from sun, moon and stars or from 
himself, the result has been an idol.’2
 
 For Barth the great mystery of creation lies not, as we might automatically be 
inclined to think, in providing a religious solution to man’s search for meaning in the 
universe. Creation, for him, is not the church’s answer to human uncertainty about 
the ultimate origins and destiny of the universe, i.e. the church’s answer to the 
question: ‘Is there a God who is responsible for bringing the world into existence and 
sustaining it?’ Rather, the fundamental mystery of creation lies not in affirming that 
God the creator exists, but rather it lies in affirming that we, his creatures, exist. 
‘How’, Barth asks, ‘can there be something alongside God, of which He has no 
need? This is the riddle of creation.’3 The answer to the riddle, according to Barth, is 
that creation is grace.4 God allows heaven and earth and us to exist not by necessity 
but by grace. ‘God’, writes Barth, ‘does not grudge the existence of the reality 
distinct from Himself; He does not grudge it its own reality, nature and freedom. The 
existence of the creature alongside God is the great puzzle and miracle, the great 
question to which we must and may give an answer, the answer given us through 
God’s Word; it is the genuine question about existence, which is essentially and 
fundamentally distinguished from the question which rests upon error, “Is there a 
God?” That there is a world is the most unheard-of thing, the miracle of the grace of 
God.’5
 
 Barth distinguishes creation as grace from all types of gnosis, ancient and 
modern, which hold ‘that what the Bible calls the Son is fundamentally the created 
world or that the world is by nature God’s child’.6 In Barth’s theology, therefore, it is 
consistent for him to say that reason cannot bring us to the point of concluding that 
the world is God’s creation, since creation for Barth is grace, and grace is beyond 
reason. 
 
                                                 
2 Dogmatics in Outline, 52. 
3 Op. cit. 54. 
4 Citing Luther, Barth affirms ‘that God, who does not need us, created heaven 
and earth and myself, [out] of “sheer fatherly kindness and compassion, apart 
from any merit or worthiness of mine”’ (op. cit. 54). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Op. cit. 54f. 
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 Another motive Barth has for excluding any philosophical approach to 
creation is that he sees creation and covenant as completely interrelated, as implying 
one another. Indeed, for Barth, creation takes place for the sake of the covenant. The 
covenant expresses the primordial truth in the God-man relationship: 
 
[W]e would not have said the last decisive word about creation, if we did not 
add that the covenant between God and man is the meaning and the glory, the 
ground and the goal of heaven and earth and so of the whole creation . . . [I]t is 
not the case that the covenant between God and man is so to speak a second 
fact, something additional, but the covenant is as old as creation itself. When 
the existence of creation begins, God’s dealing with man also begins . . . The 
covenant is not only quite as old as creation; it is older than it. Before the world 
was, before heaven and earth were, the resolve or decree of God exists in view 
of this event in which God willed to hold communion with man, as it became 
inconceivably true and real in Jesus Christ. And when we ask about the 
meaning of existence and creation, about their ground and goal, we have to 
think of this covenant between God and man. 7
 
 Barth’s theological system, in particular his rejection of natural theology, is 
nowadays, as is well known, in eclipse, or at the very least one can say that it is not 
nearly as influential or as highly respected as it once was. His comprehensive 
reliance on revelation as the only true source of knowledge about God and about 
God’s works tends now to be dismissed as an arbitrary, uncritical and thus 
indefensible form of biblical or ecclesiastical positivism. Because of his 
unwillingness to recognize any natural path leading from the world to God, he is 
even considered to have unwittingly helped prepare the way for the destruction of 
Christian faith by critical reason. However, before rejecting Barth as a fideist, it 
might be helpful to recall the objections to Christianity that he was trying to outflank 
in his own theology. It might also be apposite in this context to recall the order in 
which Christian truth would appear to be attained or accepted both in human 
experience and in the biblical witness itself. 
 
 Firstly, what were the difficulties Barth was attempting to counter? These can 
be summed up under two headings: the projection theory of religion (Feuerbach) and 
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the problem of evil. By setting his face firmly against any attempt to extrapolate from 
human experience of the world to God, and by locating the mystery of creation not in 
God primarily, but rather in the reality of the world, which exists for no reason 
reason can fathom, Barth aims at undercutting the whole force of Feuerbach’s 
objection to Christianity. To this end he agrees with Feuerbach that any humanly 
projected God is indeed an idol, arguing that God is not the goal of man’s dreams but 
man the result of God’s grace. As for the problem of evil, this problem will always 
be a stumbling-block on pure reason’s path to God. Hence, Barth starts with faith and 
revelation, abandoning any pretence of being able to argue rationally from the world 
to the existence of God the creator. Furthermore, he links creation inextricably with 
the covenant (God’s salvific will for humanity revealed fully in Christ). In this way, 
Barth is able to avoid any obviously crushing blow to his theology from the side of 
the problem of evil, whereas this problem would appear to be insuperable for any 
purely rational theodicy. 
 
 A further strength of Barth’s theology of creation lies in how it dovetails with 
the way Christianity seems to be discerned or attained in human experience and in 
the record of the Bible itself. For it is a conviction or an intuition about redemption 
or salvation that is surely of primary importance for religious believers. From such a 
conviction they may, if they wish to, go on to speak about creation as implied in any 
belief about redemption. People, however, rarely retain or lose their faith in God, 
depending on the answers they may receive to abstract questions about the origins of 
things. Rather, they find first of all, or fail to find, life good or endurable or valuable 
or lovable or meaningful or worth living, and only subsequently may they come to 
accept that the God who has made life worthwhile must also have created it. In other 
words, the ultimate source of the goodness of life must also be the ultimate source of 
its existence. 
 
 Why, however, it might be asked, not just say that the world needs no 
explanation beyond itself, or that an ‘internal solution’ to the riddle of the world 
ought to be perfectly adequate? This very position has, of course, often been 
maintained, indeed even exuberantly and defiantly so. Thus, in Proust we read: ‘It 
has even been said that the highest praise of God consists in the denial of him by the 
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atheist who finds creation so perfect that he can dispense with a creator.’8 To this 
exquisite paradox one can perhaps only respond somewhat helplessly by referring to 
the murkiness, cruelty and unfinished nature of life which seem to preclude any 
straightforward acceptance of its intrinsic wholeness or self-sufficiency, now or at 
any other point along the path of history. For even a possibly glowing future for 
humanity and the world could never of itself be reason enough to justify or redeem 
the horrors of the past. It must be conceded, however, that the permanent human 
refusal to justify such horrors is an expression of faith; it is not based on any appeal 
to a self-evident situation of fact or to a self-grounding set of ‘values’. And as such, 
it springs – as, presumably, all faith ultimately must – from hope in the transcendent 
goodness of God who cannot condone evil and who, Christianity teaches, will be 
vindicated as the Redeemer at the End of Time. 
 
 Thus it would seem, for instance, to be the case that the Israelites experienced 
the shortcomings and painfulness of existence, and in consequence perceived God 
first and foremost as a redeemer and only subsequently as a creator, and not vice 
versa. The Book of Job is a powerful, if still ambiguous, example of this process. 
And in the New Testament, Jesus is seen primarily as the redeemer or saviour and 
only secondarily as the mediator of creation. It is interesting to find the same priority 
given to existential as opposed to factual – or, one might even say, scientific – 
questions by Theodor Adorno, when he writes on the question of the value of 
philosophical knowledge: 
 
The only form of philosophy which could be justified in the face of despair, is 
the attempt to see everything in the perspective of redemption. Knowledge 
has no light other than that which shines from redemption onto the world. 
Everything else is empty and imitative, sheer technical effects.9
 
In short, knowledge – whether knowledge of creation or of anything else – is only of 
use, to put it in religious terms, in so far as it is salvific or redemptive for human 
existence. When knowledge of the world has no reference beyond itself, it can seem, 
                                                 
8 Quoted in J. M. and M. J. Cohen (eds.), The New Penguin Dictionary of 
Quotations (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1993), 321. 
9 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), 333, 
quoted by Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, tr. V. Green (London/New 
York: Burns & Oates/Paulist Press, 1977), 56. 
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literally, pointless. For its part, theology, as a discipline, is of course no better placed 
in this respect than any other intellectual activity. If theology has no reference 
beyond itself, if it becomes an end in itself, it inevitably becomes sterile. It only 
begins to live when or if it seems to be assisting people to cope with the human 
predicament, even if – indeed, perhaps, only if – this is not its self-conscious or 
deliberate primary aim. Its first aim can only ever be to seek and speak the truth. 
 
 Whether or not we find Barth convincing on creation – and on the role reason 
can or cannot play in convincing us of the truth of the doctrine of creation – is a 
question we should probably not wish to answer too hastily. It would certainly be 
foolish to dust down as sly a thinker as Barth, and then dismiss him for being – in 
any crude sense – irrational or uncritical. 
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